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Factors influencing physicians’ choice of 
workplace: systematic review of drivers of 
attrition and policy interventions to address them
Objectives: The movement of skilled physicians from the public to 
the private sector is a key constraint to achieving universal health 
coverage and is currently affecting health systems worldwide. This 
systematic review aims to assess factors influencing physicians’ choice 
of workplace, and policy interventions for retaining physicians in the 
public sector.
Methods Five literature databases were searched. Studies were in-
cluded in the review if they focused on at least one of the following 
criteria: (i) incentives or motivators for retaining physicians in the 
public sector, (ii) pull factors that encouraged physicians to move to 
the private sector, (iii) push factors that forced physicians to leave the 
public sector, (iv) policy interventions or case studies that addressed 
physician retention in the public sector, (v) qualitative reviews of pol-
icy interventions that were implemented in different health system 
settings.
Results Nineteen articles met the inclusion criteria. Six major themes 
that affected physicians’ choice of workplace were identified includ-
ing: financial incentives, career development, infrastructure and staff-
ing, professional work environment, workload and autonomy. The 
majority of the studies suggested that the use of financial incentives 
was a motivator in retaining physicians in the public sector. The re-
view also identified policy interventions including: regulatory con-
trols, incentives and management reforms. Regulatory controls and 
incentives were the two most frequently reported policy interven-
tions.
Conclusion While factors affecting physicians’ choice of workplace 
are country specific, financial incentives and professional develop-
ment are core factors. Other factors are highly influenced by context, 
and thus, it would be useful for future cross–country research to use 
standardized data collection tools, allowing comparison of contex-
tual factors as well as the examination of how context affects physi-
cian retention in the public sector.
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The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates that in order to expand 
universal health coverage, the world needs an additional 12.9 million 
skilled health professionals by 2035–physicians, nurses and midwives [1]. 
Skilled health professionals are needed to achieve, maintain and acceler-
ate progress on universal health coverage by ensuring effective coverage 
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pendently assessed the eligibility of individual studies. Re-
sults were shared with the lead author, and differences were 
reconciled through discussions.
Identification of studies
We conducted a systematic review of factors and policies 
related to attrition and retention of physicians in the public 
sector. Using key search terms, the following literature da-
tabases were searched: PubMed, EMBASE, World Bank da-
tabase, WHO Global Health Observatory as well as Google 
Scholar. The search terms included: “physicians”, “doc-
tors”, “specialists”, “retention”, “dual practice”, “recruit-
ment”, “incentives”, “motivation”, “retaining”, “motivating”, 
“physician incentive plans”, “public sector”, “public health 
sector”, “private sector”, and “private health sector”. The 
references of the included studies were also scanned in or-
der to find relevant literature that was not identified 
through the database search.
Study selection criteria
Studies were included in the review if the original research 
was presented and if the study population included physi-
cians. The studies also focused on at least one of the follow-
ing criteria: (i) incentives or motivators for retaining physi-
cians in the public sector, (ii) pull factors that encouraged 
physicians to move to the private sector, (iii) push factors 
that forced physicians to leave the public sector, (iv) policy 
interventions or case studies that addressed physician reten-
tion in the public sector, and (v) qualitative reviews of pol-
icy interventions that were implemented in different health 
system settings. Studies were excluded if they were: not in 
English, published before 1980, non–human studies, book 
chapters or book reviews, dissertations or theses, or pub-
lished abstracts. Studies were also excluded if they were fo-
cusing on physician retention in rural vs urban areas since 
the review will be focusing only on public vs private reten-
tion, and if they were discussing retention of health workers 
other than physicians such as nurses or midwives.
Data extraction and analysis
The studies were classified according to income level based 
on the World Bank classification. The study characteristics 
were extracted from all the studies and these include: first 
author, year, countries involved, study design and method 
(Table 1). The studies were then grouped into two catego-
ries: studies that were focusing on factors affecting physi-
cians’ choice of workplace (push–pull factors), and those 
that were discussing policy interventions for retaining phy-
sicians in the public sector.
Thematic synthesis was adopted in our review as codes 
were generated from illustrative quotes and then classified 
into themes [25]. During the data extraction process, the 
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for an expanding set of health care needs for all populations 
[1]. The human resource shortages are particularly acute 
in low and middle income countries in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific and exacerbated by the movement of skilled physi-
cians from the public to the private sector affecting health 
systems worldwide [2,3].
In both low– and high–income countries, physicians work-
ing in government hospitals and clinics also often practice 
privately in order to boost their earnings. This dual prac-
tice is common in many European countries including the 
United Kingdom and is particularly high in low– and mid-
dle–income countries such as Egypt, Vietnam and India 
[4]. The income gap between the public and private sector 
in these countries is a key factor motivating physicians to 
leave the public sector or work in both the public and pri-
vate sector. Indeed, it is increasingly uncommon to find 
full–time health workers who are civil servants exclusively 
working in the public sector [4–7]. For instance, in Austria 
approximately 100% of senior health specialists work in 
both sectors, in the United Kingdom 60% of public physi-
cians work in both sectors [8]. In Ireland, more than 90% 
of physicians employed in public hospitals also have priv-
ileges to practice in the private sector [8].
Other factors that have been identified as driving the move-
ment of physicians from the public to the private sector 
include: lack of academic and career development oppor-
tunities in the public sector, poor infrastructure in public 
facilities, and greater autonomy in the private sector [2,9]. 
The pervasive practice of dual practice and the shift of doc-
tors from the public sector to the private sector suggests a 
need to reassess the traditional models of physician educa-
tion, placement and compensation, and the functioning of 
labor markets for highly skilled health workers [1]. There 
is limited evidence on the policies and regulatory mecha-
nisms for promoting physician retention in the public sec-
tor [8,9].
The aim of this systematic review is to assess factors influ-
encing physicians’ choice of workplace and potential pol-
icy interventions for retaining physicians in the public sec-
tor. The review will identify the sources of dissatisfaction 
of physicians in the public sector (push factors), and sourc-
es of satisfaction of physicians in the private sector (pull 
factors), as well as the advantages and disadvantages of dif-
ferent policy interventions addressing physician retention 
in the public sector. The analysis will inform policymakers 
on the current evidence and identify policy options for re-
taining physicians in the public sector.
METHODS
The analysis was undertaken by the first author and lead 
author. At each step of the process, the first author inde-
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first author extracted illustrative quotes on push and pull 
factors from the studies focusing on physicians’ choice of 
workplace. These quotes were coded according to trends 
in common answers, and sub–themes/factors were gener-
ated, 15 factors in total (Figure 1 and Table 2). The factors 
were then synthesized into six main themes, including: fi-
nancial incentives, career development, infrastructure and 
staffing, professional work environment, workload, and au-
tonomy. The results and discussion sections were organized 
according to those themes. Each study can include more 
than one push–pull factor and is counted more than once 
when calculating the proportions in the results section (Fig-
ure 1 and Table 2).
For the policy intervention studies, illustrative quotes were 
pulled for the advantages and disadvantages of each policy 
intervention. These policy interventions were then synthe-
sized into three main themes. Each study could include 
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Table 1. Studies included in the systematic review
Income level FIrst author Year countrY studY desIgn method
Low and 
low–middle 
income
Abdul Rahim [2] 2012 Multiple countries Descriptive study Evaluation of five worldwide policy initiatives
Luboga [10] 2011 Uganda Mixed–method study Focus groups and questionnaires
Malik [11] 2010 Pakistan Mixed–method study Open ended questions, questionnaire and interviews
Russo [12] 2014 Cape Verde, Guinea 
Bissau and Mozambique
Mixed–method study Qualitative interviews and surveys
McPake [13] 2014 Mozambique, Guinea 
Bissau and Cape Verde
Cross–sectional study Survey
Lonnroth [14] 1998 Vietnam Qualitative study Individual interviews and group discussions
Gruen [15] 2002 Bangladesh Qualitative study Open–ended questionnaire and in–depth interviews
Jan [16] 2005 Multiple countries Descriptive study Critical analysis of dual practice policies
Upper 
middle and 
high income
Ashmore [3] 2013 South Africa Qualitative study Qualitative interviews
Ashmore [17] 2015 South Africa Qualitative study In–depth interviews
Ashton [18] 2013 New Zealand Cross–sectional study Postal survey
Andreassen [19] 2013 Norway Prospective cohort study Modeling physicians labor supply choices
Longmore [20] 2014 South Africa Qualitative study Open–ended questionnaire
Gonzalez [21] 2004 Not listed Modeling Principal–agent modeling
Heponiemi [22] 2013 Finland Prospective cohort study Four–year prospective questionnaire study
Cohn [23] 2009 United States Case–study Case study on the journey of Banner Medical Group
Kankaanranta [24] 2007 Finland Retrospective cohort study National postal survey completed at 5 y intervals
All income 
levels
Gonzalez [8] 2013 Not listed Modeling Two–stage theoretical modeling
Eggleston [4] 2006 Not listed Descriptive study Comparative analysis of five models of dual practice
advantages and disadvantages for more than one policy in-
tervention and was counted more than once when calcu-
lating the proportions in the results section (Figure 2 and 
Table 3).
RESULTS
The database search identified 368 hits (208 PubMed, 144 
EMBASE, 7 Google Scholar, 4 WHO Global Health Obser-
vatory, 1 World Bank, and 4 manual entries) (Figure 3). Us-
ing the study selection criteria, the titles and abstracts were 
screened and 45 articles remained. After the full–text exam-
ination of the articles, 19 articles were included in the review. 
Figure 3 uses the PRISMA framework to show the flow of 
the search during the different stages of analysis [26].
Decisions to include or exclude studies were made by the 
first author under the supervision of the lead author. The 
Figure 1. Proportion of studies by income category discussing themes affecting physician’s choice of workplace.
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Table 2. Factors affecting physician’s choice of workplace
theme sub–theme/Factor FIrst author’s last name Push Factors (IllustratIve quotes) Pull Factors (IllustratIve quotes)
Financial 
incentives
Adequacy of 
financial 
compensation
Ashmore [3], Luboga 
[10], Malik [11], 
Andreassen [19], 
Lonnroth [14], Gruen 
[15], Ashmore [17], 
Russo [12], McPake [13]
“None of the physicians in our focus 
group discussions felt their compensa-
tion was acceptable” [10].
“The most frequently mentioned condi-
tions by those who would consider leav-
ing government services were: payment 
of a compensation for transition (n = 
18); a social pension scheme (n=13); tax 
relief (n=7); and credit offers (n=6)” [15].
“Median income among physicians in 
the public sector was significantly lower 
than that of physicians in the private sec-
tor (P<0.001) and dual practice 
(P<0.001), but income differences be-
tween private–only and dual practice 
physicians were not statistically signifi-
cant” [12].
“Some specialists interviewed appeared to value 
high financial rewards more than others, and 
thus felt more desire to work in the private sec-
tor” [3].
“… physicians in private setups were motivated 
by the availability of financial incentives other 
than pay and good working conditions in their 
current jobs” [11].
“Our study implies that overall wage increases 
and tax reductions give the medical doctors an in-
centive to move to full time jobs, in particular in 
the private sector, at the expense of working in oth-
er jobs in the health sector of the economy” [19].
“In some districts, physicians are on the payroll, 
but may come to work only half the day, largely 
because they are attending to private practices as 
a means of income supplementation” [10].
“When asked about the reasons for engaging 
with the private sector, answers from the survey 
were broadly consistent with the qualitative find-
ings, with most physicians reporting “increasing 
income” as the main factor for practicing in the 
private sector (95.5% responding important or 
very important)…” [12].
Income relative 
to workload
Ashton [18] “… the private sector is valued for the opportu-
nity to work independently (4.45), the freedom to 
apply ideas in the workplace (4.28) and the in-
come earned relative to the workload (4.06).”
Sustainability  
of income
Lonnroth [14] “All interviewees expressed difficulties 
in living on the salary in the public 
health care sector” [14].
“A significant finding was that all the non–private 
physicians said that they had previously tried to 
go private or would try to go private if they could 
not support themselves or their family finan-
cially” [14].
Financial 
security
Longmore [20],  
Luboga [10]
“There was much emotion surrounding 
remuneration inconsistencies and result-
ing financial insecurity, doctors feeling 
that it is simply not acceptable to fail to 
pay salaries on time…”[20]. [20]
“The other problem is job security, in 
most cases you don’t know where you 
will go, they can fire you at any time…” 
[10] [10].
Career 
develop-
ment
Professional 
development
Ashmore [3] [3], Luboga 
[10] [10], Malik [11] 
[11], Gruen [15] [15]
“There was also dissatisfaction ex-
pressed in the public sector with the 
sense of career progression. It was re-
peatedly noted how once a senior spe-
cialist in the public sector, it is easy to 
become ‘stuck’, for example, since there 
are few chief or principal specialists jobs 
available” [3].
“Only about one fourth of physicians 
(26%) said their employer offered suffi-
cient opportunities for promotion” 
[10].
“There was also a definite sense that the private 
sector presented opportunities for more recogni-
tion of one’s experience and seniority, and thus a 
sense of career progression, if only through 
higher prestige and, relatedly, higher wages.” [3]
“Most of the participants intended to change 
their current position (86%), mainly for profes-
sional development (66%) and better income 
(21%).” [15]
Education and 
training 
opportunities
Luboga [10] [10], Gruen 
[15] [15]
“More than 66% of the doctors in pri-
mary and secondary care considered 
training opportunities to be poor, as 
opposed to 33% of the doctors in tertia-
ry care facilities” [15].
“A sizeable number (66%) rated “access to high-
er education” as “very important”, and another 
large portion (60%) said this was an important 
enough issue for which to consider changing 
jobs” [10].
Physician 
reputation
Russo [12] [12], 
Kankaanranta [24] [24]
“For dual practitioners, the main motivations 
were opportunities to increase income, to con-
solidate professional reputation, and to take 
advantage of the complementarities between the 
two job modalities” [12].
“Also, Generally held to be a prestigious posi-
tion seemed to have high t–test values each year, 
implying that it is also a good indicator of physi-
cian’s job satisfaction, when the variable Good in-
come compared to workload was modelled as a base 
variable” [24].
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theme sub–theme/Factor FIrst author’s last name Push Factors (IllustratIve quotes) Pull Factors (IllustratIve quotes)
Infrastruc-
ture and 
staffing
Resource 
availability
Ashmore [3], Luboga 
[10],, Malik [11], Gruen 
[15]
“On the other hand, the public sector 
was noted to have fewer resources and 
less equipment and drugs available, 
factors which hindered the ability to do 
one’s job as desired, often considered 
frustrating” [3].
“There are significant problems with 
working conditions in all health facili-
ties. Access to equipment, supplies, 
drugs, electricity, and water are seri-
ously compromised” [10].
“In contrast, demotivators in current 
jobs were mostly organizational factors 
including fewer opportunities for higher 
qualifications, resource unavailability 
and poor supervision” [11].
“So at least the other advantage of being in the 
private sector [is] you get to see what’s current 
and what’s currently in use as well, which we 
don’t have on the other side.” [3]
“Physicians (and other health workers) in the pri-
vate (non–profit) sector were more likely to rate 
working conditions, more highly, with statisti-
cally significant differences measured for the 
availability of supplies, equipment and drugs, 
utilities, transportation, and time for workers to 
eat lunch.” [10]
Staffing 
shortages
Ashmore [3], Luboga 
[10], Gruen [15]
“Lack of public sector staff, relative to 
the private sector, was another resource 
issue that caused public sector dissatis-
faction” [3].
“Lack of doctors themselves also caused 
dissatisfaction, implying there is a damag-
ing cycle where retention is a problem, 
since lack of retention may encourage 
others to leave” [3].
“Physicians discussed staffing shortag-
es, unreasonable patient loads lack of 
available specialists, and positions that 
have gone unfilled for months or even 
years” [10].
Working 
conditions
Luboga [10], Malik [11], 
Gruen [15]
“Physicians in five of eight focus group 
discussions complained of infrastruc-
ture issues, complaining about a lack of 
clean water or electricity, not enough 
beds for patients or space in the wards, 
and poor infection control” [10].
“Conversely, physicians working in pri-
mary care health facilities more often re-
ported poor working conditions as a 
demotivator” [11].
“The most often agreed opinions referred 
to lack of drugs and equipment (22%), 
long waiting times (17%), lack of doc-
tors and nurses (13%) and lack of clean-
liness in government facilities (11%)” 
[15].
“Physicians (and other health workers) in the pri-
vate (non–profit) sector were more likely to rate 
working conditions, more highly, with statisti-
cally significant differences measured for the 
availability of supplies, equipment and drugs, 
utilities, transportation, and time for workers to 
eat lunch” [10]. [10]
“Conversely, physicians in private setups were 
motivated by the availability of financial incen-
tives other than pay and good working condi-
tions in their current job” [11].[11]
Professional 
work 
environ-
ment
Relationship 
with patients
Ashmore [3] “Patient relationships also seem to be 
strained in the public sector, due to rel-
ative unwillingness or inability of pa-
tients to follow directions, as well as, po-
tentially, some classism and racism 
among doctors” [3].
Relationship 
with supervisors 
and administra-
tion
Ashmore [3], Luboga 
[10], Longmore [20], 
Kankaanranta [24]
“Distrust of the public hospital ‘ad-
ministration’ and DoH, meanwhile, 
seemed universally high.”; “The above 
respondents were noticeably embittered 
towards state and hospital management, 
which seemed almost universal” [3].
“In questionnaires, physicians were the 
least likely to say their immediate su-
pervisor (presumably, upper manage-
ment) “cares about me as a person”, 
and the least likely to say they received 
recognition for doing good work” [10].
“Sixty–four per cent of doctors felt that 
they were not respected and valued by 
HR staff” [20].
“Whatever the reasons, in H1 at least, relations 
between different health providers (rather 
than between doctors) were generally perceived 
as much better in the private sector” [3].
“In one focus group at a private facility, physi-
cians spoke of supervisors who respected staff, 
assisted in problem solving, and instilled a 
sense of ownership and responsibility in staff” 
[10].
Managerial 
interference
Ashton [18] “Key sources of dissatisfaction were work-
load pressures, mentally demanding 
work and managerial inferences” [18].
“They also have a good income relative to their 
workload and little managerial interference” [18].
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countries studied were from Sub–Saharan Africa (South 
Africa, Uganda, Cape Verde, Guinea, Mozambique and Bis-
sau), Europe (Norway and Finland) Asia (Pakistan, Viet-
nam, Bangladesh, and Malaysia), North America (United 
States) and the Pacific (New Zealand) (Figure 4 and Table 
1). The review included 12 studies on push–pull factors 
for physician retention and 7 studies on policy interven-
tions for retaining physicians in the public sector.
Factors affecting physicians’ decision to 
leave public sector/enter private sector
We identified six main themes that affected physicians’ 
choice of workplace including: financial incentives, career 
development, infrastructure and staffing, professional work 
environment, workload and autonomy (Table 2).
The majority of the studies (number n = 11; 92%) high-
lighted the importance of financial incentives in determin-
theme sub–theme/Factor FIrst author’s last name Push Factors (IllustratIve quotes) Pull Factors (IllustratIve quotes)
Workload Work hours, 
amount of work 
and workload 
pressures
Ashton [18], Luboga 
[10], Malik [11], Russo 
[12], Kankaanranta [24]
“While our survey did not include ques-
tions specifically related to levels of 
stress, dissatisfaction was higher in the 
public sector for all sources of dissatis-
faction. These included factors related to 
stress such as poor employer/employee 
relations, workload pressures and 
mentally demanding work” [18].
“Only about a third (36%) of physicians 
said they thought their workload was 
manageable. All focus group physicians 
complained about work overload” [10].
“In public setups, tertiary physicians re-
ported long duty hours, less personal 
safety and heavy workloads as impor-
tant demotivators compared with those 
in private setups…” [11].
“For factors affecting job dissatisfaction, 
variables such as Tight, inflexible time-
table, Poor employee/supervisor relations, 
and Tense atmosphere in workplace had 
the highest t–test values, when the vari-
able Monotonous work was modelled as 
baseline” [24].
“For those working exclusively in the private sec-
tor the motivations were higher earnings, auton-
omy, and flexibility of working hours” [12].
Autonomy Ability to apply 
their own ideas 
and flexibility in 
patient 
treatment
Ashton [18], Ashmore 
[3], Russo [12], 
Lonnroth [14], 
Kankaanranta [24]
“The ability to work with more autono-
my in the private sector, however, did 
appear to carry a distinct advantage for 
those who valued it. This seemed par-
ticularly true of those frustrated with 
public ‘regulations and rules’, who 
wanted to work on their own terms” [3].
“Complicated procedures in the public 
sector mentioned by the interviewees in-
clude ‘bureaucratic’ procedures to fulfill 
eligibility criteria for free or subsidized 
treatment as well as rigid diagnostic and 
treatment strategies that follow more or 
less fixed guidelines” [14].
“…work autonomy and flexibility are the key 
motivations at the base of their choice to dedicate 
exclusively to the private sector, since earnings 
are not significantly different from those of dual 
practice physicians” [12].
“In contrast, when working in the private prac-
tice, specialists value the opportunity to work 
independently and to apply their own ideas in 
the workplace” [18].
“Private physicians on the other hand can apply 
more flexible approaches to diagnostic proce-
dures and choice of treatment, which are influ-
enced by patients’ preferences and ability to pay” 
[14].
“Both private and non–private physicians said 
that private practitioners provided more flexible 
and individualized care, which they described 
as appealing to patients” [14].
“Each year, the variable Chance to apply one’s 
own ideas in the work emerged as one of the 
most important job satisfaction dimensions af-
fecting intention to change work sector” [24].
ing physicians’ choice of workplace [3,10–15,17–20]. In-
adequacy of financial compensation and financial 
insecurity were found to be major factors that encouraged 
physicians to leave the public sector or practice in both the 
private and public sector (dual practice). Competitive sala-
ries and higher income were the main reasons physicians 
were motivated to move to the private sector [3,10–15,17–
20]. In one of the studies that focused on three lower in-
come cities in sub–Saharan Africa, it was found that 95.5% 
of physicians reported increasing income as an important 
or very important factor in their decision to practice in the 
private sector [12].
Career development was also an important motivator and 
was discussed in around 50% (n = 6) of the studies [3,10–
12,15,24]. One study in Uganda found that only one out 
of four physicians in the public sector reported that their 
employer offered them sufficient opportunities for promo-
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opportunities [3,18]. These include free use of research and 
other academic facilities, and greater opportunities for 
teaching and research [3,18].
Infrastructure and staffing were highlighted in 33% (n = 4) 
of the studies as being important determinants of choice of 
work place [3,10,11,15]. Lack of resources, shortage of 
staff, unfilled physician positions, poor facility infrastruc-
ture and poor working environment were important push 
factors in the public sector. The availability of up–to–date 
resources and positive work environment were motivating 
factors that were pulling physicians to work in the private 
sector or both in the public and private sectors [3,10,11,15].
Approximately 42% of the studies (n = 5) [3,10,18,20,24] 
indicated that professional work environment plays an im-
portant role in retaining physicians in the public sector. 
Figure 2. Proportion of studies by income category discussing policy interventions to address physician retention in the public sector.
Figure 3. Flowchart on the database and the study selection.
tion [10]. In the same study, a significant number of physi-
cians (66%) ranked access to higher education as very im-
portant, and 60% of physicians reported that this was a 
significant issue that would lead them to consider chang-
ing jobs [10]. Physicians reported the lack of opportunities 
for professional and academic development, stagnant ca-
reer progression and poor training opportunities as reasons 
that would push them to leave the public sector or practice 
in both the public and private sector. Opportunities for 
professional development, and being in a prestigious posi-
tion were identified as main factors that were pulling phy-
sicians into the private sector in some of the countries [10–
12,15,24]. On the other hand, in countries like South 
Africa and New Zealand where central hospitals are run by 
public academic institutions, physicians working in the 
public sector are presented with professional development 
Figure 4. Geographic origin of included studies (n = 19).
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Table 3. The advantages and disadvantages of policy interventions for addressing physician retention in the public sector
PolIcY themes PolIcY InterventIons FIrst author dIsadvantages (IllustratIve quotes) advantages (IllustratIve quotes)
Regulatory 
controls
Banning dual 
practice
Gonzalez [8], Jan 
[16]
“The more able ones tend to be more involved 
in the private sector since their ability allows 
them to get a higher return. The less able tend 
to combine both public and private activities if 
dual practice is allowed, or work only in public 
practice when this is not the case. When dual 
practice is forbidden, the population of physi-
cians working the public sector for a given sal-
ary decreases” [8].
“In addition, when the public and private sec-
tors do not share physicians, higher private sec-
tor earnings are expected to attract more high-
ly skilled physicians, leaving those of less 
ability in the public sector” [8].
“In practice, bans do not prevent these activities, 
but instead take them outside the regulatory 
and policy jurisdiction of government” [16].
Permitting dual 
practice
Gonzalez [21], 
Eggleston [4], Jan 
[16], Abdul Rahim 
[2], Gonzalez [8]
“We found that the physician’s dual practice 
has conflicting effects. On the one hand, his 
interest in curing patients and gaining pres-
tige, generates an over–provision of health 
services” [21].
“These theoretical predictions stand at odds 
with much of the policy discussion, which 
tends to assume that allowing public sector 
physicians to earn private revenue will harm 
the quality of services provided in the public 
sector, although it may benefit private sector 
patients and physicians” [4].
“Since monitoring of provider time and effort 
is costly, often only minimal presence in a 
public practice is required to access the non–
pecuniary benefits of public employment (eg, 
official salary and civil servant fringe benefits 
such as public housing)” [4].
“A physician with both public and private 
practices may use public resources to treat 
private patients, whether by lifting supplies 
(eg, gauze, medications) or treating patients 
at the public facilities without paying any rent 
or charge for such use” [4].
“Furthermore, dual practice providers may 
have incentives to induce demand for private 
practice services. The propensity of health 
care providers to over–refer to facilities in 
which they have financial interest is widely 
recognized” [4].
“However, dual job holding by public sector 
health professionals is potentially a problem 
because it may create inappropriate incentives 
as the boundaries between a public health 
professional’s day–to–day job and his or her 
private practice can become blurred” [16].
“Firstly, it can encourage the misappropria-
tion of scare public sector resources into the 
private sector” [16].
“The second reason why private practice by 
public health workers has been posited as a 
problem is because it may lead to doctors di-
verting patients from public facilities into 
private services” [16].
“Also, no evidence thus far supports dual 
practice as a method of improving equitable 
delivery of healthcare” [2].
“On the other hand, if the HA is able to control 
these incentives to over–provide services, then it 
can benefit from the physician’s increased interest 
in doing more–accurate diagnosis” [21].
“Interestingly, some consistent results emerge 
from these diverse conceptualizations: (1) allow-
ing dual practice may improve social welfare; 
and (2) allowing dual practice may improve the 
quality of public services, under specific cir-
cumstances” [4].
“Allowing dual practice may enable the govern-
ment to recruit quality providers at a modest 
budgetary expense” [4].
“To the extent that physicians attempt to build a 
good reputation that will enhance future private 
practice revenue, allowing dual practice also 
gives a kind of performance–based incentive 
for physicians to exert effort” [4].
“From the point of view of the public sector, al-
lowing health professionals to engage in private 
practice can be a means of minimizing the bud-
getary burden required to retain skilled staff” 
[16].
“In contrast to these measures, the potential val-
ue of recognizing and legitimizing dual practice 
is that, at one level, it enables some degree of 
control to be exercised over quality and safety” 
[16].
“The importance, therefore, of providing official 
recognition is that it allows policy–makers to in-
corporate such activity within the bounds of its 
regulatory and policy jurisdiction” [16].
“Practitioners would continue to enjoy the pres-
tige of public sector positions and ongoing ca-
reer development while mitigating economic 
opportunity costs otherwise incurred if solely 
servicing the government...” [2].
“This implies that dual practice might be desir-
able because it allows the HA to reduce the wage 
needed to retain physicians working in the pub-
lic sector” [8].
Limiting dual 
practice
Gonzalez [8], 
Gonzalez [21], 
Eggleston [4]
“Overall, profit limitations have a milder ef-
fect on the amount of dual practice performed 
by physicians.” [8].
“Secondly, focusing on limiting policies, we 
have shown that limiting income is always 
less effective than limiting involvement” [8].
“Therefore, our conclusion is that this sort of 
regulatory policy may be beneficial from a so-
cial point of view, although it can generate as a 
non–desired effect a reduction on physicians’ 
incentives to perform accurate diagnoses” 
[21].
“In either case, the limits on dual practice only 
affect behavior if physicians anticipate that the 
contractual terms will be enforced” [4].
“… as it only affects the high skilled physicians 
that are compelled to reduce private involvement 
in order to satisfy their earning constraint” [8].
“In contrast, policies that limit involvement direct-
ly target the intensity of dual practice and are 
therefore more effective in limiting its costs” [8].
“We have shown that if physicians’ payment con-
tracts include proper incentives, then limiting 
physician’s private income can be optimal, 
whereas introducing exclusive contracts is always 
useless” [21].
“Better ability to monitor and contract can mini-
mize shirking on public practice duties, ap-
propriating supplies and using public equip-
ment without paying rent. Transparent 
contractual relationships between public and pri-
vate practices, such as rental of facilities and sub-
contracting for specific services, can offset many 
of the costs associated with allowing the same 
physicians to practice in both” [4].
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PolIcY themes PolIcY InterventIons FIrst author dIsadvantages (IllustratIve quotes) advantages (IllustratIve quotes)
Self–regulation Jan [16] “Indeed, in certain circumstances, this could 
lead to an incentive to “overprovide” qual-
ity in the public sector, particularly, in high–
income settings, because the health facility 
rather than the individual doctor bears the 
cost of providing additional quality” [16].
“Consequently, there is a certain trade–off be-
tween quality and access to health care be-
cause higher–quality services will tend to be 
more costly, and thus specific measures ad-
dressing financial access need to be consid-
ered when proposing such forms of self–reg-
ulation” [16].
“Self–regulation of this nature works because sig-
nificant weight is given to an individual’s reputa-
tion as a doctor in public practice, which influ-
ences his or her income–generating capacity in 
private practice” [16].
“The role of such regulation could be viewed as 
addressing the uncontrolled proliferation of 
private providers and, in a sense, establishing 
barriers to entry” [16].
“The rationale for professional self–regulation is 
that it recognizes the collective interest in in-
stituting some form of cooperative behavior 
among individual agents” [16].
Compulsory 
services
Abdul Rahim [2] “The evidence base on effectiveness of com-
pulsory services to date remains lacking” [2].
Incentives Offering 
exclusive 
contracts
Eggleston [4], 
Gonzalez [21], 
Gonzalez [8]
“The problem with this measure is that in the 
context of the strict resources constraints that 
often exist within low– and middle–income 
countries, such payments can be prohibitive-
ly costly–particularly if incomes in the private 
sector are high and thus there is a need for 
greater levels of compensation” [4].
“We have shown that if physicians’ payment 
contracts include proper incentives, then lim-
iting physician’s private income can be opti-
mal, whereas introducing exclusive con-
tracts is always useless” [21].
“Exclusive contracts, however, are shown to be a 
useful tool for cost–containment when physi-
cians are paid on a salaried basis” [21].
“This illustrates how exclusive contracts offer 
greater flexibility for the HA to mitigate loss of 
productivity associated with dual practice, 
which makes the HA less interested in banning 
dual practice when rewarding policies are avail-
able” [8].
Offering 
rewarding 
contracts
Gonzalez [8], 
Abdul Rahim [2], 
Jan [14]
“Rewarding policies, ie, those that pay an ex-
tra amount to physicians who give up their 
private practice, are only desirable when 
limitations are difficult to enforce” [8].
“The Commission determines salaries for 
public sector workers and hence deems it un-
fair to selectively raise wage of health em-
ployees and exclude other sectors” [2].
“The most immediate and overriding con-
straint on the feasibility of this option how-
ever is the cost to the public sector. In cir-
cumstances where there are tight resource 
constraints in the public sector, this option is 
unlikely to be feasible” [14].
“Remuneration should reflect the level of work 
responsibility and be deemed fair vis–à–vis other 
sector counterparts to ensure continued attrac-
tion and retention of staff” [2].
“Furthermore, a mix of payment mechanisms 
such as time–based, service–based and popula-
tion–based is linked with enhanced provider 
performance” [2].
“On this basis, the incentive to shift effort from 
public–sector to private–sector work would be 
offset by making remuneration for public 
practice, like that of private practice, related to 
effort or output” [14].
Providing 
professional 
development 
opportunities
Abdul Rahim [2] “Continued education, interactive training and 
professional development geared towards the pri-
ority health conditions and needs of the local 
population improves health worker competency 
and motivation” [2].
Manage-
ment 
reforms
On–boarding 
programs
Heponiemi [22] “Organizational justice was not able to buffer 
the association between being or becoming a 
new public GP and turnover intentions” 
[22].
“Our results showed that new public GPs had 
2.6 and those who stayed as public GPs both 
times had 1.6 times higher likelihood of hav-
ing turnover intentions compared to those 
who stayed at other positions both times” 
[22].
“Our results suggest that by improving organiza-
tional justice primary care organizations could 
improve GP’s job satisfaction and involvement 
and consequently maybe increase GP work’s at-
tractiveness as a career option. For example, 
organizations could invest in supervisor train-
ing, particularly because previous studies have 
shown that leaders can be trained to act in a more 
just manner and this in turn improves subordi-
nates’ attitudes and behavior” [22].
Organizational 
justice
Cohn [23] “One year after the on–boarding program was 
initiated, not a single new physician left BMG, 
which is a sharp turnaround from the 10 percent 
loss the group experienced previously” [23].
“Since the onboarding program began, however, 
everyone who has worked with the new physi-
cians (including allied health professionals) has 
noted an improvement in physician morale 
and in the practice environment” [23].
Lack of trust with the hospital administration team, poor 
patient–physician relationships, high managerial interfer-
ence, lack of respect and appreciation of physicians, and 
poor supervisor–employee relationships were the main 
push factors reported in the studies. The pull factors re-
ported in the studies were: positive relationships between 
physicians, stronger patient–physician relationships, low 
managerial interference, and strong supervisor–physician 
relationship [3,10,18,20,24].
Approximately 58% of studies (n = 7) mentioned workload 
and autonomy as important factors in physician retention 
[3,10–12,14,18,24]. Push factors that were mentioned in-
clude: workload pressures, mentally draining work, heavy 
workload, long hours, low autonomy, bureaucracy and ri-
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gidity in patient treatment and inflexible schedule. The pull 
factors that attracted physicians to the private sector were: 
high autonomy, the ability to apply their own ideas and 
flexibility in diagnostic treatment and procedures [3,10–
12,14,18,24].
Policies for retaining physicians in the 
public sector
The review identified a range of policy interventions that fo-
cused on improving physician retention in the public sector 
along with their advantages and disadvantages. Of the seven 
studies included two discussed options for policy interven-
tions in lower income countries, three focused on higher in-
come countries and two compared policy interventions in 
both lower and higher income countries (Figure 2). We 
found three main categories of policies for retaining physi-
cians in the public sector: (a) regulatory controls, (b) incen-
tives and (c) management reforms (Table 3).
(a) Regulatory controls included banning dual practice, 
permitting dual practice, limiting dual practice, profession-
al self–regulation and compulsory services. Around 72% 
of the studies (n = 5) highlighted regulatory controls as pol-
icy interventions to address physician retention in the pub-
lic sector [2,4,8,16,21]. The studies did not identify advan-
tages for banning dual practice, however, disadvantages 
included: the increased likelihood for highly skilled physi-
cians to move to the private sector, and the risk of having 
physicians practicing in both sectors illegally [8,16].
In terms of permitting dual practice, the following advan-
tages were reported: improvement of the quality of service 
in the public sector, increased interest of physicians to pro-
vide more accurate diagnosis, establishment of perfor-
mance based incentives, enhanced ability to retain skilled 
physicians without a budgetary burden, and increased pos-
sibility of exercising a higher degree of control over quality 
and safety. As for the disadvantages these include: the pos-
sibility of over–provision of medical services, the potential 
harm to the quality of services in the public sector, utiliza-
tion of public resources in private practice, over–referrals, 
lack of clear boundaries between the public and private 
sector, lack of evidence showing improvement of equitable 
health care delivery, and higher time allocation in private 
practice while taking advantage of employment benefits in 
the public sector [2,4,8,16,21].
The studies highlighted several advantages for limiting du-
al practice such as: effectiveness in reducing costs on the 
supply side, encouragement of highly skilled physicians to 
reduce private practice involvement, and high efficacy 
when physician contracts include incentives and offsets 
costs associated with dual practice. There are also disad-
vantages in limiting dual practice including: reduction in 
physicians’ incentives to provide accurate diagnoses, and 
limited efficiency of this intervention if contractual terms 
were not enforced [4,8,21].
Professional self–regulation, was identified as an important 
function that provided the opportunity to introduce high-
er standards among practicing physicians, which in turn 
helped to enhance the prestige among physicians who met 
established standards [16]. Self–regulation could also im-
prove quality of physician services in the public sector, and 
establish de facto barriers to enter the private sector by con-
trolling licensing or certification [16]. Compulsory public 
sector service was also noted as a potential policy interven-
tion [2]. A disadvantage of this policy is the lack of studies 
that assess the effectiveness and success of compulsory ser-
vices in retaining physicians in the public sector [2].
(b) Incentives for retention in the public sector included: ex-
clusive contracts, offering rewarding contracts and/or finan-
cial incentives, and providing professional development op-
portunities. Around 72% of the studies (n = 5) highlighted 
incentives as policy interventions to address physician reten-
tion in the public sector [2,4,8,16,21]. Exclusive contracts 
were identified as being useful for salaried physicians, but 
noted to be expensive to implement and not be as useful 
when physicians had incentive contracts [4,21].
In terms of rewarding contracts and financial incentives, 
the advantages of this policy intervention were the attrac-
tion and retention of physicians in the public sector, the 
enhancement of physician performance, and the reduction 
in the loss of productivity in the public sector. As for the 
disadvantages, these included: costliness in some cases, 
limited feasibility and it is only considered when limita-
tions are difficult to impose [2,8,16]. For example, Jan et 
al. stated that the cost to the public sector was the main 
obstacle that prevented the use of incentives as a policy op-
tion, particularly in situations where there are resource con-
straints in the public sector [16]. Gonzalez and Macho–
Stadler also reported that policies that provided financial 
incentives for physicians who leave the private sector were 
only appealing when limitations on private practice could 
not be imposed [8].
Provision of professional development opportunities was 
also listed as an intervention that motivated, and improved 
the competency of physicians in the public sector. No dis-
advantages were identified, however [2].
(c) Management reforms identified in the studies included 
the establishment of on–boarding programs for newly hired 
physicians and organizational justice. Organizational jus-
tice refers to physicians’ perceptions of fairness in the work-
place. On–boarding programs for physicians generally fo-
cus on four key aspects: credentialing and employment, 
orientation, marketing, and staff integration [22]. Around 
29% of the studies (n = 2) listed management reforms as a 
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policy intervention for addressing physician retention 
[22,23]. The advantages of these reforms included the po-
tential retention of physicians in primary care and general 
practice, and improvement of physician morale and work-
place environment. The disadvantage of this policy was the 
uncertainty in influencing intentions of new general prac-
titioners [22,23].
DISCUSSION
The studies included in this systematic review explored 
push and pull factors that affect physician movement from 
the public to the private sector. Six studies focused on low 
income and low middle income countries (lower income 
countries) and six studies focused on upper middle income 
and high–income countries (higher income countries) (Ta-
ble 1). A country’s economic context influenced the factors 
affecting physicians’ choice of workplace. The influence of 
economic context was apparent in the variation in the 
number of studies that highlighted issues for each factor 
affecting physician’s choice of workplace (Figure 1).
In terms of factors, it is interesting to note that managerial 
interference, relationship with patients and income relative 
to workload were only reported in higher income coun-
tries. Similarly, working conditions, sustainability of in-
come and education and training opportunities were only 
mentioned in lower income countries.
The most frequently reported theme across all the studies 
was financial incentives. In lower income countries the 
most recurring themes in descending order were: financial 
incentives, career development, infrastructure and staffing, 
workload, autonomy and professional work environment 
(Figure 1). In higher income countries these were: financial 
incentives, professional work environment, workload, au-
tonomy, career development and infrastructure and staffing 
(Figure 1).
In terms of infrastructure and staffing, lack of resources such 
as drugs and equipment, poor working conditions, poor fa-
cility infrastructure, lack of clean water and electricity, lack 
of cleanliness in government facilities and staffing shortages 
were reported as push factors in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and 
Uganda [10,11,15]. In addition, staffing, workload and au-
tonomy were important driving factors for physician’s choice 
of workplace in these lower income countries. In South Af-
rica, a higher income country, the public sector was also 
found to have fewer resources and less equipment and drugs 
available, shortage in hospital staff, and poor working con-
ditions compared to the private sector [3].
Career development was also one of the main key drivers 
for physicians to work in the private sector in higher in-
come countries. Examples of the motivating factors that 
were listed in the studies include: recognition and prestige, 
the opportunity to work independently, the ability to apply 
their ideas, and/or the ability to provide individualized care 
[3,12,14,24]. However, in higher income countries like 
South Africa and New Zealand that have strong public 
health systems, there are greater opportunities for further 
education, and professional development in the public sec-
tor compared to the private sector [3,18].
In terms of workload, in higher income countries, tight in-
flexible schedules and heavy workload were reported as 
factors pushing physician out of the public sector in high-
er income countries [18,24]. Lower income countries also 
reported similar factors such as long duty hours and heavy 
workloads [10,11]. The professional work environment al-
so plays a role in driving physicians from the public to the 
private sector. Generally, lack of respect and appreciation 
of physicians by human resources staff, high managerial 
interference and lack of trust toward the government were 
reported in higher income countries as factors driving phy-
sicians away from the public sector [3,20]. However, these 
factors were also reported in Uganda [10].
The review identified a range of policy interventions that 
focused on improving physician retention in the public sec-
tor. The country’s income category determined the type of 
policy interventions that was discussed. Regulatory con-
trols and incentives were reported in both higher and low-
er income countries. Self–regulation and compulsory ser-
vices were only reported in lower income countries. 
However, management reforms were only highlighted in 
higher income countries.
Regulatory interventions were among the most common 
policies used. Permitting dual practice was the most recur-
ring policy intervention for both lower and higher income 
countries. Although there was no evidence to support com-
pulsory services, self–regulation had some advantages such 
as establishing barriers for physicians to enter the private 
sector and addressing the uncontrolled proliferation of pri-
vate physicians. There were no advantages reported for 
banning dual practice in both income settings.
The majority of the studies in lower and higher income 
countries reported using some type of incentive in addition 
to or instead of regulatory controls. Providing professional 
development opportunities was only reported in lower in-
come countries and its advantages included improving 
physician competency and motivation [2]. Offering exclu-
sive or rewarding contracts were highlighted as policy op-
tions in both lower and higher income countries. However, 
financial incentives were noted to be costly and posed a 
heavy burden on lower income countries.
Management reforms were specific to higher income coun-
tries; however, interventions such as supervisor trainings 
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and on–boarding programs may increase physician reten-
tion in the public sector. As Heponiemi et al. reported that 
by enhancing organization justice, primary care facilities 
could improve general practitioners’ (GP) job satisfaction 
and potentially increase the attractiveness of GP work as a 
career option [22]. Organizational justice and effective on–
boarding programs may help increase physician retention 
in the public sector, and reduce turnover by decreasing re-
cruitment costs.
An interesting finding from this review is the high degree 
of similarity that exists between the push–pull factors that 
we identified and the brain drain issues that drive physi-
cians to migrate both within and across countries. In a sys-
tematic review that aimed to examine motivating factors 
that would reduce medical migration both within and 
across countries, the following themes were identified: fi-
nancial incentives, career development, continuing educa-
tion, hospital infrastructure, resource availability, hospital 
management and personal recognition or appreciation 
[27]. These themes were all highlighted in our review; how-
ever, workload and autonomy seem to be specific to phy-
sicians’ choice of workplace between the public and private 
sector.
A major drawback in this review is the limited availability 
of published literature on physician retention in the public 
sector. Through the database search we only identified 19 
studies that met our inclusion criteria, which might have 
impacted the interpretation of our findings as well as gen-
eralizability. Although we attempted to connect the varia-
tion in themes to different income levels, the sample size 
was too low to make any causal conclusions. Another fac-
tor affecting generalizability is the regional distribution of 
the studies, 53% of the studies focused on Sub–Saharan 
African and Asian countries and only 26% of studies were 
on North America, Oceania and Europe. There were no 
studies on Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East 
and North Africa. In addition, only studies in English were 
included and other databases such as those for humanities 
and social sciences were not considered. However, the ma-
jority of physician studies would be expected to be cross–
listed in medical databases examined here. Another limita-
tion, is the difficulty of drawing conclusions from studies 
that were conducted in different countries, at different 
times, with different methodologies, and in different health 
systems and regulatory environments.
To the best of our knowledge this may be the first system-
atic review that specifically focuses on examining factors 
influencing physician retention and different policy inter-
ventions for improving retention in the public sector. Giv-
en the limited literature on physician retention in the pub-
lic sector additional research is required, particularly to test 
the effectiveness of policy options for retention of physi-
cians. It would also be useful for future cross–country re-
search to use standardized data collection tools, allowing 
comparison of contextual factors as well as the examina-
tion of how context affects physician retention in the pub-
lic sector. Given that financial incentives were frequently 
reported in both lower and higher income countries, cost 
controlling mechanisms for the private sector should be 
implemented such as benchmarking physician salaries with 
the public sector. The lack of private sector regulation in 
lower income countries as well as higher income countries 
needs to be addressed, this could be implemented as part 
of the efforts for expanding universal health coverage.
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